In short: Some ecological fieldwork involves research on individuals or groups of fellow animal species. Investigating invertebrates, birds, mammals, amphibians, and other organisms includes both passive empirical work (observations) and active disturbances (such as trapping, collecting, and dissecting). Many of the intervening methods and research endeavors in the pursuit of knowledge cause significant stress and suffering for fellow animals.

This brief excursion into animal ethics is ideally read before embarking on a research project involving non-human/fellow animals, regardless of its scope. The entry’s goals are to debunk arguments against moral considerations for animals and to initiate reflection on the planned methodological design, its normativity, and a researcher’s behavior on site during the project involving fellow animals. Foremost, we aim to start a reflection on how to realize peaceful inter-being relationships within scientific work and to cause as little harm as possible to other beings. To foster awareness of the discriminating speciesist position, in this article, we will use the terms 'human animals' and 'fellow animals'. We regard this as necessary for precise argumentation.

Positionality: Both of us authors were born into and educated in a Western, eurocentric knowledge and value system. While we try to push the boundaries, we acknowledge our limitations in using arguments in animal ethics that were mainly also produced in the Western eurocentric context. Our education and the discussion on the topic will not end with the following entry.

Content Note: This article contains terms and literature links that revolve around animal suffering, pain, and violence.

1 Background
- 1.1 What are “animals”?
- 1.2 Human animal uniqueness?
2 Animal ethics - a brief history of the main Western arguments
3 In practice: How to conduct your ecological field work?
- 3.1 Reflections prior to your project:
- 3.2 Things to consider for certain methods:
4 Literature
5 Further reading & recommendations

Background[edit]

What are “animals”?[edit]

Animals are a group of organisms that dominate humans’ perception of Life on Earth. They can be defined by several characteristics that distinguish them from other living beings, such as plants and fungi. Formally speaking, animals are multicellular eukaryotic organisms that undergo a distinct developmental stage, the blastula, which leads to the formation of complex tissues and organs. They obtain nutrients and energy by consuming other dead or living organisms, possess sensory organs and nervous systems, are capable of movement, and, although some asexual reproduction occurs, the predominant form of reproduction is sexual (Freye et al. 1991). Though we are also increasingly learning about the complexity in adapting and communicating of plants and fungi, animals differ especially from plants and fungi in their ability to represent their environment to themselves through their senses in a way that enables them to act, at least in part, intentionally based on these representations (Korsgaard 2018).

Human animal uniqueness?[edit]

According to the definitions of animals above, human beings are animals in the most neutral sense. We have evolved alongside all other animals in terms of physiology and anatomy, and today we know that we share high percentages of our DNA with some of our fellow species (International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 2001; Yoo et al. 2025). However in Western epistemologies, humans have long since been perceived as mentally and cognitively superior to fellow animals, and have acted accordingly as companions, preservers, or patrons, but also aggressively as masters, oppressors, or slaughterers. We seldom saw ourselves as merely another animal species. The underlying concept here is speciesism, which states “the idea that we [humans] are the product of a special act of creation, and that the other animals were created to serve us” (Singer 2002, p. 206). Putting it more precisely: “Speciesism is the unjustified comparatively worse consideration or treatment of those who do not belong to a certain species” (Horta & Albersmeier 2020). This concept has been studied by e.g. intersectionality scholars, adding a more crtitical perspective: “Speciesism suggests humans are prejudiced towards other species because they believe themselves [as a species] to be dominant and superior. Speciesism is often referred to as a system of oppression like racism or sexism” (Ko 2019). Although Charles Darwin already stated that capacities might differ in degree between animals and humans, but not in kind (Bradie 2011), speciesism remains prevalent in Western human action and science today.

A last note on the argument that humans are, in fact, animals: this notion should not be confused with, e.g., alpha male movements that take “animalistic” behavior (e.g., wolf packs) as an inspiration and justification for their own sexist or oppressive behavior (Russel 2021).

Animal ethics - a brief history of the main Western arguments[edit]

From the Bible to Aristotle’s pyramid of beings to the modern meat and animal testing industries, this chapter summarizes Western human animals' long-standing tradition of creating narratives that promote human animal superiority and fellow animals’ inferiority, resulting in, i.e., harmful scientific practices. The narrative has been supported by different arguments: human animals’ unique rationality, sentience, morality, language, tools, culture, the capacity to feel pain/emotions, and the idea of a self and future are just some of the many characteristics that human animals have claimed are unique to being human. Fellow animals are, in turn, interpreted as lacking these capacities, which is used to justify suppressive treatment and the exclusion of fellow animals from moral considerations. These concepts evolved over time and with manifold worldviews supporting them. In the following paragraphs, we elaborate on the most prominent arguments and the relevant questions at their core.

Who decides the hierarchy? The Christian notion of human animal domination[edit]

The biblical account of the creation of the Earth was long interpreted as presenting a hierarchy of the human-animal relationship in a godly world (White (1967); see also e.g. Gen 1:26). Earth was most prominently seen as a place of human dominion over fellow animals and only indirectly as a place of stewardship and compassion for animals (e.g. Kay 1989; Reed 2000). This hierarchy influenced Christian societal values and norms (for a contrasting interpretation, read Preece & Fraser 2000).

In the pre-Christian Roman Empire, slaughtering both slaves and fellow animals for entertainment was accepted. This changed under Christianity, when killing human animals was forbidden, and killing fellow animals was at least restricted. However, fellow animals were still mostly excluded from the moral sphere. Concern for animals in the Old and New Testaments was based rather on fear of punishment by God for failing to appreciate His creation or on a speciesist concern for the human soul, since showing cruelty towards fellow animals made cruelty towards human animals more likely (Singer 2002). Humanism during the Renaissance followed that line of thinking and placed human animals in the centre of the universe, denying fellow animals a similar moral status.

A second biblical account of human animal domination - specifically male human animal domination - is the interpretation of “the fall of man”, blaming Eve (the first woman) and the serpent (a fellow animal) for being banished from God’s Garden of Eden. A contemporary, eco-feminist reading points out the bias in this interpretation and offers a view based on empathetic and equal relationships between human and fellow animals (Özsert 2023).

Sentience - Can they suffer?[edit]

The constructed hierarchical categorization of human versus animal also led to the belief that animals cannot feel pain. René Descartes, a believer in the immortal soul in human animals, defined fellow animals as mere machines (Descartes 2004), capable of immediate sensation, but incapable of mental results like pain or any other judgment of the sensation. In his theory, the body is split from the mind, denying that the two interact in any fellow animal. Vivisection (dissecting “research” on animals while they are still alive and conscious) is just one of the cruelties that followed from this belief. Kant also stated that we have no direct duties concerning fellow animals, as such beings are not self-conscious. Thus, they can be treated as means to an end, the end being “man“ (Kant & Infield 1930; Kant & Stark 2008).

Jeremy Bentham, in contrast, made a case for the animal liberation movement by arguing in a footnote that the only relevant question is “Can they suffer?” rather than how they differ from human animals (Bentham, Burns & Hart 1970). The following phase in Western history is then described by Singer as the “era of excuses”, in which authors, such as Bentham, notably stopped their line of argumentation at the choice of eating meat - the flesh of fellow animals. Singer evaluates this as them not living up to their own moral arguments (Singer 2002).

The current relationship between human animals and fellow animals is a continuation of historical dualistic oppressions, excuses, and constant attempts to find new grounds for a strict demarcation line between fellow and human animals. Although there is ample evidence of fellow animal sentience (de Waal & Andrews 2022; Bekoff 2024), today’s factory farms, sports, and animal testing labs cause suffering to a degree that is historically unmatched, and barely justifiable even without believing in a dualistic boundary (Singer 2002). The fact that the suffering of fellow animals is mostly invisible in our Western societies makes it worse.

Consciousness - Are they aware of themselves?[edit]

The question of what consciousness is and whether there is a defined boundary between conscious and non-conscious states is still debated (Harris 2019). Since the term „unconscious“ with regards to human animal states of awareness means “currently not conscious, but generally having consciousness,” we use the term non-conscious for distinction here.

Consciousness can be described as a property of the matter that produces complex thoughts. It does neither just equal complex thoughts nor does it just equal the mere structure of the matter that produces thoughts, but goes beyond (Van Gulick 2025). The underlying question asked here with regard to fellow animals is whether or not they are aware of themselves and to what degree consciousness needs to be present in a being to grant it a status worthy of moral consideration. Accepting an intermediate position that fellow animals differ from human animals in their degree of awareness (Allen & Trestman 2017) and the capability of using their consciousness (Nussbaum 2024) but are conscious, leads to an expanding moral circle (Weston 2004, van den Berg 2011, Sebo 2025).

Rationality - Can they reason for their behavior?[edit]

There is evidence for high intelligence and intentionality in fellow animal behavior beyond instinct, but no, animals cannot give reasons for their behavior (Watanabe & Huber 2006). At least, human animals have not yet been able to detect reasoning in intra- or interspecies communication. However, does that justify a view that those with less ability to reason exist for the sake of those who can? According to Aristotle, less “rationality”, which he defined and granted solely to human animals - in the historic context solely to white, wealthy, able-bodied men - is connected to being closer to animality (Aristotle, Barnes & Lane 2016). This resulted in values and ideas of sovereignty, such as human domination over nature; male domination over women; master’s domination over a slave; and reason’s domination over the body and emotions (Singer 2002).

Time and context of Aristotle’s thinking have changed, and we strongly urge every human animal today to use their rationality and reasoning ability to question their own behavior and view of the treatment of animals. Considering, e.g., the case of zoo animals in captivity, which show intelligence, curiosity, and creativity, but suffer from boredom (Lilley et al. 2017) for human animals’ entertainment. Can we reason for such human animal behavior?

Communication - Can they articulate their needs?[edit]

Understanding language was, for a long time, a prime argument for human animal superiority. It was also used against fellow human animals for colonial oppression. Several experiments, e.g. American Sign Language tests done with chimpanzees (Gardner et al. 1989), reject human animal uniqueness in using particular sounds for communication and being capable of learning language. Although in comparison to human animal children, the chimpanzees’ capacity for learning stagnated, and they never initiated conversations themselves, the experiments showed that basic conversations and expressions of needs were possible. The chimpanzees learned to sign ASL and respond. The question arises to what degree the use of language needs to be developed, and therefore, how a human language test is a reasonable test for determining which species count as articulate enough to be ethically considerable. Would all human animals pass the test? Do they have to pass it to prove their human-ness?

The inability to use human animal language does not equal a lack of ability to communicate and to articulate needs. Today, we know of complex communication systems that different animal species use (Kaplan 2014). These include vocalizations (e.g. singing, whistling, alarm calls), but also body language (e.g. honey bee dances; see Barron & Plath 2017), and chemical signals (see Wyatt 2014). While fellow animals lack the normativity and symbolic complexity of human animal language, they use sophisticated methods for individual referencing and identification.

Strata of anthropocentric interpretation - Who is valued and why?[edit]

Speciesism, as stated above constructs a general dualism, exalting human over fellow animals. But within the group of fellow animals, valuing also differs between species, creating strata of interpretation based on anthropomorphism and social classifications. Anthropomorphism describes the phenomenon of attributing human animal characteristics to fellow animals with different tendencies. On the one hand, there can be an irrational tendency to value pet animals that are granted a human-animal-like moral status, e.g., “smart” fellow animal memes on the internet, or beloved pets like Karl Lagerfeld’s cat, which had its own bodyguard and a diva image created by Lagerfeld himself (Mauries 2015) in distinction to farm animals bred for meat and milk or laboratory testing animals who lack similar moral consideration. On the other hand, the argument of anthropomorphism is also used as an accusation tending to undermine legitimate ethical arguments for similarities between human and fellow animals that do not follow from irrational attributions but from broadening the anthropocentric perspective (de Waal 1999). Interestingly, intercultural comparisons show that special statuses are assigned to different fellow animals in different cultures (e.g. Western milk and meat industry v. sacred cows, see Harris 1998; or guineapigs as pets v. food sources, see Archetti 2020), thereby demonstrating that these are social classifications based on human animal interpretation and responses to environmental conditions rather than being inherent to the respective species. The statuses and classifications somewhat connect an anthropomorphism of the certain fellow creatures to the exclusion of the respective species from potential food sources, due to more human animal-likeness Critical reflection and careful examination of data interpretation help avoid falling into one or the other pitfall of assigning too little or too much human animal likeness to other species and instead reach more consistency and humbleness in thinking about fellow animals (de Waal 1999).

Human Rights and "Animal Rights"[edit]

A further question arising from the similarities between human and fellow animals and the basis for moral consideration is whether fellow animals can or should have the same rights as human animals. Tom Regan explores this question as one of the most prominent scholars in the field of (fellow) animal rights. He differentiates between legal and moral rights, whereas the main difference lies in the universalism of moral rights (Regan 1997 & 2004). Legal rights come with certain privileges, but also with obligations and responsibilities. Such rights, which require the capacity to take responsibility, are not granted to all human animals and cannot, of course, be granted and then expected of fellow animals. Having moral rights means that a being is part of the moral consideration of, e.g., specific actions, and that this being can be morally wronged. Regan builds on the distinction between moral agents and moral patients, where the latter are dutiless and are granted rights given by dutiful moral agents. Similar to Human Rights, which aim to secure bodily integrity and freedom from suffering for all human animals, advocates for Animal Rights suggest universal rights based on the intrinsic value of fellow animal life. Regan explores the validity of such claims to rights, acquired and unacquired natural duties, the individual’s right to respectful treatment, and the right of fellow animals not to be harmed under the notion of respect: “Individuals who have inherent value have an equal basic right to be treated with respect. According to the rights view, this is a right that we can never be justified in ignoring or overriding. In all our moral dealings with moral agents and patients, we must always treat them with that respect to which, as possessors of inherent value, they are due” (Regan 2004, p. 286).

A way forward - Granting moral status to fellow animals[edit]

The current Western relationship between human animals and fellow animals is a continuation of historical dualistic oppressions, excuses, and constant attempts to find new grounds for fundamental distinction between fellow and human animals. Philosophical discourse completes the findings by e.g, arguing that “[w]hen we ask why we think humans are the only types of beings that can be morally wronged, we begin to see that the class of beings able to recognize moral claims and the class of beings who can suffer moral wrongs are not co-extensive” (Gruen & Monsó 2024). Korsgaard (2002) adds that “it makes (almost) no sense to rank creatures in a hierarchy of importance, because creatures are the entities to whom things are important”.

Based on the insights discussed above, from our perspective, a shift in thinking, caring, and behavior is necessary, especially in scientific research on fellow animals. There is enough evidence of fellow animals’ communication, their sense of self and future, and most importantly, the proven capacity to suffer in multiple ways. Even if there is no clear evidence yet that, e.g., also species of insects feel pain: We know of human error in the history of scientific findings, so why would we want to risk hurting any being?

Some of the arguments are just absurd, some are proven wrong, rejecting the hypotheses through scientific experiments or philosophical argumentation. (Eco-)Feminist animal ethics broadens the perspective even more, going beyond questions of cognition or other constructed differences between human and fellow animals. Philosophers and scholars here take a closer look into the intersectionality of these dualistic oppressions (e.g., Plumwood 2002; Adams & Donovan 1999; Adams & Gruen 2021; Gaard 1997), adding arguments of sexism, ableism, racism, and other forms of discrimination to the question of the animal. They study, for instance, the sexualization of both women and meat (or farm animals), visible in steak advertisements, but also the historical tradition of meat as food, often exclusively for men. Diving deeper into feminist animal ethics would however push the limit of this entry.

Looking for ways forward, we can learn from cultures that place intrinsic value in fellow animals and wider nature, and train our own thinking to be more compassionate and humble.

In practice: How to conduct your ecological field work?[edit]

We have established that there have been countless efforts, theories, and debates about unique human animal features that support the acclaimed superiority, denying fellow animals moral status. Taking into account all of the above, research projects and their methods should undergo a thorough check for necessity and proportionality in causing harm to other beings.

In the following, we present a list of reflection questions to check your own research design.

Reflections prior to your project:[edit]

Why am I doing this research? Do the fellow animals need to be dead/die or suffer in the process and why?
- Consider aspects of proportionality and sufficiency (see Occam’s razor).
- Is there any other method that would cause less stress or harm and yield similar results?
- Are the fellow animals only means to an end?
Remember: fellow animals are not there for our disposal or for research purposes. They are living beings, and their existence deserves moral consideration.
If the research is proportional, not just an end in itself, and the research design cannot be changed, researchers need to ensure that no unnecessary killing, no hurting, no suffering, and no stress are induced by the research.
Have you considered all non-killing or less stressful methods? Put yourself into the other beings’ position. There may be an alternative approach. Be brave to shift the perspective on our behavior and treatment towards fellow animals as research objects.
Ethical pre-checks and approval: Which ethical procedures are preconditions of the research? Does the research need to be checked by a board of ethics?

Things to consider for certain methods:[edit]

Traps: Are my traps as fellow animal-friendly as they can get? Is there a security that, i.e., traps are always checked on time, especially in dry or hot areas? Is everyone in the research team informed about the risks of possible suffering?
- Consider scheduling a team briefing about the concerns and the importance of avoiding any possible harm.
Marking animals (e.g. with paint or by removing scales of reptiles): Is the stress necessary? Have other, less stressful or potentially less harmful methods been tried or considered for the project?
Hand trapping: Are you safe? Are the fellow animals safe? There is always disturbance and stress when going through a habitat and checking beneath rocks and other hiding places. Is this method necessary in your research project?
Collaring of animals: How stressful is the process? Are animals stable and not hampered by collars? Do other individuals of the same species treat them differently?
Observing animals: Does the observation represent a stressor to the animals? Do the animals get disturbed?

Literature[edit]

Allen, C., & Trestman, M. (2017). Animal consciousness. The Blackwell companion to consciousness, 63-76.
Archetti, E. P. (2020). Guinea Pigs: food, symbol and conflict of knowledge in Ecuador. Routledge.
Aristotle, Barnes, J., & Lane, M. (2016). Aristotle's Politics: Writings from the Complete Works: Politics, Economics, Constitution of Athens. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882960
Barron, A. B., & Plath, J. A. (2017). The evolution of honey bee dance communication: a mechanistic perspective. Journal of Experimental Biology, 220(23), 4339-4346.
Bekoff, M. (2024). The emotional lives of animals: A leading scientist explores animal joy, sorrow, and empathy—and why they matter. New World Library.
Bentham, J., Burns, J. H., & Hart, H. L. A. (1970). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Athlone Press.
Berg, F. v. d. (2011). Harming others: Universal subjectivism and the expanding moral circle. Dissertation, Leiden University.
Bradie, M. (2011). The moral life of animals. Oxford Handbooks.
Descartes, R. (2004). Letter to the Marquess of Newcastle. The Turing test: Verbal behavior as the hallmark of intelligence, 35-38.
de Waal, F. B. (1999). Anthropomorphism and anthropodenial: consistency in our thinking about humans and other animals. Philosophical topics, 27(1), 255-280.
de Waal, F. B., & Andrews, K. (2022). The question of animal emotions. Science, 375(6587), 1351-1352.
Freye, H.‐A., L. Kämpfe & G.‐A. Biewald (1991). Zoologie. 9th, revised edition, UTB Gustav Fischer. pp. 16-18.
Gardner, R. A., Gardner, B. T., & Van Cantfort, T. E. (Eds.). (1989). Teaching sign language to chimpanzees. Suny Press.
Gruen, L. & Monsó, S. (2024). The Moral Status of Animals. in: Zalta, E. & Nodelman, U. (eds.)The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/moral-animal/.
Harris, A. (2019). Conscious: A brief guide to the fundamental mystery of the mind. HarperCollins Publishers.
Harris, M. (1998). Good to eat: Riddles of food and culture. Waveland Press.
Horta, O., & Albersmeier, F. (2020). Defining speciesism. Philosophy Compass, 15(11), 1-9.
International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium. (2001). Initial sequencing and analysis of the human genome. Nature 409, 860–921.
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Kay, J. (1989). Human dominion over nature in the Hebrew Bible. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 79(2), 214-232.
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Lilley, M. K., Kuczaj, S. A., & Yeater, D. B. (2017). Individual differences in nonhuman animals: examining boredom, curiosity, and creativity. In Personality in nonhuman animals (pp. 257-275). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
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Nussbaum, M. C. (2024). Justice for animals: Our collective responsibility. Simon and Schuster.
Özsert, S. (2023). A Distinctive Reading of the Creation Story: Adam, Eve and the Serpent in the Traditional Accounts from the Feminist Perspective. Journal of Academic Social Science Studies, 16(96), p.79.
Mauries, P. (2015). Choupette: Aus dem Leben einer Katze an der Seite von Karl Lagerfeld. Edel Germany. Hamburg.
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Reed, S. A. (2000). Human dominion over animals. Reading the Hebrew Bible for a New Millennium: Form, Concept, and Theological Perspective: Theological and Hermeneutical Studies, 2, 328-348.
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Regan, T. (2004). The case for animal rights. University of California Press.
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Singer, P. (2002). Animal liberation. HarperCollins. - especially Chapter 5 (Man’s Dominion)
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Van Gulick, R. (2025): "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2025/entries/consciousness (access Nov 4th, 2025).
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